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Vertical integration theory is a classical topic that begins with 1930s. A flock of 
scholars have devoted themselves to studying especially new institutional Economics 
and got substantial achievements. Coase published the first important and influential 
paper called “The Nature of The Firm”. Afterwards, with the push of Williams, 
Cheung, Grossman, Hart, Moore etc, vertical integration theory started to develop at 
very high speed. 
Vertical integration means that two or more production phases separable in 
technology merge to one enterprise or unified ownership. It includes forward 
integration and backward integration. Forward integration makes enterprises nearer to 
consumers, for example, raw material processing enterprises merge with products 
making enterprises and product making enterprises extend to products selling areas. 
Backward integration aims at ensuring the stability of enterprises management and the 
production resource. So it can decrease the cost and increase products advantages. 
This paper is divided to four parts: The first part introduces the theory of western 
economists about vertical integration enterprise origin, at the same time has a critical 
comment on it compared with Marx enterprise theory; The second part begins with 
enterprise organization structure, compares vertical integration with lateral integration, 
emphasizes on the statement of vertical integration enterprise property rights theory. 
The third part is about vertical integration enterprise effective boundary; Last part is 
based on the former statement, points out the vertical integration enterprise theory’s 
limits and innovations. 
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③ Williamson, O., 1979, “Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations”, Journal of Law 





















表了治理结构的选择边界。即当交易的专用性K< K1 时,市场的治理成本 低,通
过市场采购或出售是 优决策；当K1<K< K2 时,关系合同的治理成本 低,这时应

















一旦 初的谈判敲定下来，作为“ 早行动者”， 初契约赢得者在某方面具备
了成本优势，它具有特殊的位置或学识，包括获得保密或专利技术与管理程序，
以及专门的劳动技巧。因此，协约各方就会被锁定在一种双边交换之中，可以预
                                                        










































（Grossman & Hart& Moore）指出，契约的不完备
性对交易成本起着决定作用。完备的契约固然可以消除机会主义行为，但现实的
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